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The “New” Terrorism: Myths and Reality by Thomas R. Mockaitis. 2008.
Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 142 pp. ISBN 978-0-8047-59707; $21.95.
Review by Gabriel Rubin, Ph.D., Assistant Professor, Montclair State University
Thomas Mockaitis’s book represents a quality summation of much of the
recent literature on terrorism and al-Qaeda written for a lay audience. The author
covers definitions of terrorism, the history of terrorism, the history and
motivations of al-Qaeda, and how to combat the present terrorist threat to the
United States. From the perspective of a terrorism scholar or professional,
Mockaitis does not drill much new ground in his book, save with his surprisingly
narrow and intriguing definition of terrorism. This review will begin with
Mockaitis’s interesting take on who terrorists are and then evaluate the book’s
other conclusions.
As is well-known, the definition of terrorism and a terrorist group is as
slippery as many of the terrorists themselves. Bruce Hoffman famously wrote an
entire chapter in the seminal Inside Terrorism, where he struggled with defining
the term. Hoffman concluded that terrorism is: “the deliberate creation and
exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of
political change” (Hoffman 2006: 40). But Hoffman also noted that “virtually
any especially abhorrent act of violence perceived as against society … is often
labeled ‘terrorism’” (Hoffman 2006: 1). Indeed, after the 2007 summer fires in
Olympia, Greece, the Greek government considered bringing terror charges
against arsonists (See
http://www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/europe/08/27/greece.fires.ap/index.html).
Mockaitis sees “terror” as a tool used by conventional armies, insurgents,
criminals, and “terrorists” alike. He thus seeks to find a “functional rather than a
theoretical definition of the problem” (Mockaitis 2008: 3). The definition he
comes up with cuts out of the equation most groups the United States calls
“terrorist.” He writes that terrorist groups have Utopian goals that are not up for
negotiation, have a transnational or international focus, and employ
“indiscriminate violence for its own sake with no larger political or other
purpose” (Mockaitis 2008: 7-8, 13).
If terrorists are purposeless killers with Utopian goals that are unwilling to
negotiate, then who belongs in the category “terrorist”? Aum Shinrikyo, or
Supreme Truth, the Japanese millenarian cult, certainly fits this definition. So
does Al-Qaeda and Al-Qaeda in Iraq. Neither AQI nor Al-Qaeda Central seems
to be willing to negotiate, and both have committed heinous acts of brazen terror,
such as the November 2005 bombing of a wedding in Amman, Jordan. Perhaps
the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Popular Front for the Liberation
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of Palestine (PFLP) of the 1970s, when the groups were famous for hijacking
airplanes, could be deemed terrorists. Then again, these groups clearly had
ethnonationalist goals in mind.
Most of the organizations Americans know as terror groups are defined by
Mockaitis as insurgent groups. Militant organizations that fit this bill are the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Irish
Republican Army. All of these groups have nationalist aspirations, have largely
targeted the state power they wish to upend, and have arguably used terror
“selectively.” Mockaitis states that insurgency is “an organized movement to take
over a state from within through a combination of propaganda, guerilla warfare,
and terrorism” (Mockaitis 2008: 5). I have heard of Hezbollah and Hamas being
called resistance groups, terrorist groups, or even political parties, but never
insurgent groups. The LTTE, Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), and the IRA may fit
more neatly into this definition since they have engaged in more traditional civil
wars—albeit while relying heavily on terrorist tactics.
In employing a decidedly narrow definition of terrorism, Mockaitis
reopens the thorny subject of how we define the term at all. Is it true that
countries simply label their modern enemies terrorists? The epithets volleyed
between Israelis and Palestinians, the former calling the latter “terrorists” and the
latter accusing the former of “state terror,” are a case in point. Mockaitis is right
that terror is a tactic that is meant to conjure an emotion. But it is also more than
that. Most definitions of terror include wording to the effect that terrorists
purposely attack non-combatants and that they do so for political purposes.
Further, terror groups are always non-state or quasi-state actors.
Deciphering between terrorists and insurgents may be a harder task than
the counterterrorist community cares to admit. Though the difference in terms
may sometimes be moot for combating the groups, the label “terrorist” carries
with it a message of strong condemnation that should not be taken lightly. Much
was made of the U.S.’s labeling of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard as a terror group
for its activities in Iraq. Hamas has rigorously sought international acceptance,
but its placement on terror lists the world over has proven a major hindrance.
Counter these examples with those of the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan or the
Badr Brigade of Iraq, groups that are seen to be insurgents not terrorists and thus
have not been subjected to the revulsion reserved for terrorists.
Mockaitis is right to reopen the definitional debate in the field of terrorism
studies. Hoffman’s definition, encompassing any organization that purposefully
employs fear for political purposes, may be too broad. I would like to see a
definition that falls between Hoffman’s and Mockaitis’s. Perhaps terrorists can be
defined as non-state actors that purposely commit violence against noncombatants for political purposes. The definition of “non-combatant” would then
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have to be wrangled over. (For example, are Israeli civilians who served in the
IDF non-combatants?)
The rest of Mockaitis’s book provides a strong summation of the recent
literature on terrorism. He proposes that resources be used more efficiently in the
fight against terror. He believes that counterinsurgency (COIN) techniques
should be employed to fight al-Qaeda and that the Global War on Terror has
ceased to serve its purpose. The author writes that, “COIN requires a
comprehensive strategy to address the economic, social and political causes of
terrorist violence. In this strategy winning the hearts and minds of disaffected
people improves intelligence gathering, which in turn leads to the more focused
use of police and military force against terrorist organizations and networks”
(Mockaitis 2008: 125).
Mockaitis further believes that, despite al-Qaeda’s success in the late
1990s and early 2000s in its fight against America, there must be, in the words of
Ian Lustick, an “attempt at triage in the face of too many possible threats”
(Lustick 2006: 96). America is too large a country with too many “soft targets” to
protect itself completely. Mockaitis suggests a tripartite approach, consisting of
antiterrorism (hardening American vulnerabilities), counterterrorism (conducting
offensive operations against terrorists), and consequence management (planning
for the aftermath of terror attacks so as to mitigate the consequent damage) to
battle the terrorist threat. He ends his book by emphasizing that, “[r]isk and
vulnerability are the price of living in a free society” (Mockaitis 2008: 129), a
note hit by both Ian Lustick (2006) and John Mueller (2006) in their critiques of
the war on terror and the Department of Homeland Security.
Mockaitis’s book presents a strong primer to the study of terrorism,
particularly for a lay audience. At 142 pages (with notes) it is a quick read full of
interesting tidbits on al-Qaeda and combating the terror threat. For scholars of
terrorism, such as myself, I suggest reading his first chapter on definitions of
terrorism in which Mockaitis brings a welcome new perspective to the debate on
how terrorism should be defined.

References:
Hoffman, Bruce. 2006. Inside Terrorism, Revised and Expanded Edition. New
York: Columbia University Press.
Lustick, Ian. 2006. Trapped In the War on Terror. Philadelphia, PA: The
University of Pennsylvania Press.
Mueller, John. 2006. Overblown: How Politicians and the Terrorism Industry
Inflate National Security Threats, and Why We Believe Them. New York: Free
Press.

Brought to you by | Montclair State University Lib
Authenticated
Download Date | 3/11/19 6:16 PM

